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Electoral competition can have a significant influence on government 
decisions regarding public spending.  In this paper I examine whether the move to 
multiparty elections in many African countries in the last ten years has been 
associated with a clear change in priorities for public spending on education.  In 
particular, I argue that the need to obtain an electoral majority may have prompted 
governments to devote greater resources to primary schools.  I test this hypothesis 
using panel data on electoral competition and education spending in thirty-five 
African countries over the period 1980-1999.  The results strongly support the 
hypothesis and are robust to controls for both unobserved country effects and other 
determinants of spending. 
  3
1. Introduction   
  The political economy of education spending in developing countries is a 
subject that has received scant attention from researchers in recent years despite its 
obvious importance.  This paper is a preliminary attempt to investigate how one 
particular feature of a country￿s political system, the extent of electoral competition, 
may influence decisions regarding public spending on education.  In particular, I ask 
whether increased electoral competition in some African countries during the 1990s 
may have prompted governments to spend more on education relative to other 
expenditures.  Electoral competition may have prompted politicians to devote 
greater resources to primary schooling in particular.  Recent African experience 
provides us with a natural experiment for testing this hypothesis; if during the 1980s 
free elections were almost absent in Africa, during the 1990s a number of African 
countries have moved towards a system where elections are more free and more 
open to participation of multiple political parties or candidates.  There is also good 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that in several cases electoral competition has 
prompted sitting governments to devote greater budgetary resources to primary 
education.  The Ugandan President￿s decision in 1995 to establish free universal 
primary education was made in the middle of an election campaign.1  In Tanzania a 
similar political context has prompted the country’s President to announce a move to 
free universal primary education.2 
The logic underlying my hypothesis is that contested elections may have 
prompted African governments to be more responsive to the demands of rural 
groups in particular, and rural groups are likely to be more concerned with spending 
on primary education relative to secondary and tertiary education when compared 
with urban groups in African countries.  I develop this proposition by drawing 
implications from literature on the politics of economic policy in African countries 
under authoritarian rule (and in particular the classic work by Bates, 1981), 
compared with observations about the possible effects of electoral competition on 
                                                 
1 For a recent review of electoral competition in Uganda see Furley (2000).   
2 This was announced in a presidential address in April 2001.  I thank Simon Appleton for bringing 
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political participation in Africa.  I also acknowledge that there are plausible 
alternative arguments about democratization and education spending in African 
countries.  Given that many of the initial democracy movements after 1989 were 
triggered by demonstrations led by university students, one might actually expect 
political liberalization to result in greater resources being devoted to tertiary 
education.  One might also hypothesize that increased electoral competition would 
have no impact on education spending if African voters have little means of 
subsequently  holding their elected representatives accountable for the actions they 
take.        
I test the hypothesis about electoral competition and education spending 
using cross-section time-series data covering 35 African countries over the period 
1980-1998.  The results show that when they are subject to multiparty competition, 
African governments have tended to spend more on education, and more on 
primary education in particular.  These results are statistically significant in OLS 
estimates, in fixed effect estimates which control for unobserved country effects, and 
in instrumental variables estimates which account for the possibility that one or 
more of the explanatory variables may be endogenous.  My results with regard to 
political competition and education spending are robust to the inclusion of a number 
of control variables.   
My estimates also attempt to control for possible external influences on 
education, in particular by donors.  To the extent that donors see education spending 
(and more specifically primary education spending) as a priority for governments, 
then one might expect to observe that countries which receive more aid will tend to 
spend more heavily on education spending (and more on primary education in 
particular).  Surprisingly, the statistical results presented here suggest the opposite.  
Countries which receive more aid as a share of their GDP tend to spend less on 
education and less on primary education in particular.  This result is robust to 
controls for unobserved country effects and for outlier observations.  The same result 
is also observed when using net flows from the World Bank alone, rather than all 
overseas development assistance.  This negative correlation between aid and 
education spending holds even when one instruments for aid to take account of the  5
possibility that aid is itself endogenous to education spending.  With this said, 
interpretations of this result may be complicated by the fact that data on education 
spending for some countries may not include donor-financed expenditures.    
  In the remainder of the paper I first proceed in section 2 by considering 
theoretical arguments about the link between electoral competition and public 
spending.  Sections 3 and 4 present data on education expenditures and political 
competition.  Section 5 presents panel data estimates.  Section 6 considers alternative 
specifications, omitted variables, and other robustness issues.   
 
2.  Electoral competition and education spending 
  Governments in political systems with competitive elections face 
fundamentally different threats to their rule when compared with autocratic 
governments.  In an autocracy, the principal risk for a leader is that he will be 
overthrown by force, perhaps as a result of a military coup, due to street 
demonstrations, or following a general strike.  In countries where there are free 
elections contested by multiple candidates, rulers may still fear losing office through 
a coup, but they also need to anticipate the possibility that they might be thrown out 
of office by the electorate.  This basic difference can imply that leaders in autocratic 
and democratic systems face fundamentally different incentives with respect to 
public policy.  In an autocracy, leaders need to pursue policies that will satisfy those 
groups which can credibly threaten to use force to obtain what they want.  When 
there are competitive elections, in contrast, rulers are more likely to face incentives to 
pursue policies which satisfy a majority among the electorate.3   
  In African countries where governments are not obliged to compete in free 
elections, it is commonly argued that urban groups find it easier to organize and 
protest against government policies than do those who live in rural areas.  In a 
seminal contribution, Bates (1981) argued that rural groups in Africa face greater 
costs of collective action because they tend to be distant from a country￿s capital, 
                                                 
3 For a review of discussions of political competition and policy choice in democracies see Przeworski, 
Stokes, and Manin (1999).  6
they are geographically separated, and they are frequently divided by language 
and/or ethnicity.  Urban groups in contrast, have the advantage of being more 
geographically concentrated.  According to Bates, differential costs of collective 
action between urban and rural groups helped explain why the economic policies 
adopted by African governments during the 1960s and 1970s tended to exhibit an 
￿urban bias￿.  So, for example, governments tended to tax agriculture while 
subsidizing imported food items consumed largely by urban groups. 
  While Bates (1981) did not directly consider education spending, his theory 
has clear predictions for this area of government policy.  To the extent that urban 
groups in Africa tend, on average, to have more years of schooling than their rural 
counterparts, they are more likely to be concerned about government spending on 
secondary schools and universities, as well as primary schools.  Rural groups, on the 
other hand, may place greater weight on primary school spending.  Likewise, 
university students in African countries have historically been one of the groups 
which has been most willing to demonstrate publicly against governments whose 
policies they oppose, while the same can hardly be said for primary school students.  
These factors suggest that education spending in autocratic African countries should 
be biased against primary education.  Evidence of skewed education policies in 
African countries is provided by statistical evidence which shows that during the 
1980s the ratio between public education spending per university student and 
spending per primary school student was significantly higher in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than in other regions.4  Existing evidence also suggests that there is a significant 
urban-rural gap with regard to levels of primary school enrollment in African 
countries, as enrollment rates in capital cities frequently reach 90% even in the 
poorest countries while less than 20% of children in rural areas may attend primary 
school.  This too suggests that rural groups have been at a disadvantage in terms of 
obtaining public resources for education.5    
                                                 
4 Pradhan (1996) shows that this ratio stood at 65.3 for the average African country in 1980 and 44.1 in 
1990.  In Latin America the relevant figures were 8.0 and 7.4 for 1980 and 1990 respectively.  In South 
Asia the relevant figures were 30.8 and 14.1 for 1980 and 1990 respectively.   
5 A recent World Bank report on education in Africa (World Bank, 2000) draws this conclusion based 
on data from Niger, Ethiopia, and Mali.   7
  In the last fifteen years a number of African countries have moved away from 
autocracy and towards a system of selecting governments through elections.  As 
reviewed by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) if, on average, African governments 
have become more democratic, there has nonetheless been considerable variation 
from country to country.  In some cases democratization has meant truly competitive 
elections while in other cases it has meant elections that are rigged in favor of a 
sitting government.  In subsequent work van de Walle (2001) has argued that 
democratization in Africa has not yet resulted in a fundamental shift in the types of 
political pressures which African leaders face, but that it may nonetheless have 
initiated more long-term changes in the politics of economic decision making.    
While increased electoral competition in many African countries has clearly 
not led to a wholesale reorientation of economic policy making, it does seem 
plausible, based on the recent examples of Uganda and Tanzania, to suggest that 
electoral pressures have pushed politicians into paying more attention to the 
demands of groups which heretofore had little political influence.  Given that the 
majority of electors in almost all African countries live in rural areas, if we follow the 
above arguments, then one would expect politicians to become more responsive to 
the demands of rural groups when they are subject to electoral competition.  This 
could include increased primary education spending.  To the extent that demands 
for primary education are met by increasing expenditures rather than reallocating 
priorities within the education budget, one would expect to observe an increase 
overall education spending as well.         
One crucial assumption in the above argument is that levels of participation 
are higher the more competitive the election.  While it has been a common 
observation about elections in advanced industrial countries that more competitive 
elections tend to have higher rates of voter turnout, some analysts have suggested 
that African voters might not respond in a similar manner.  Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997) criticize this view and provide quantitative evidence to demonstrate 
that African electors are in fact no different in this regard; they are more likely to 
vote the more competitive the election.  Using the winner￿s share of total votes cast 
as a proxy for the competitiveness of the election, they find, based on a sample of 29  8
African elections over the period 1990-94, that there was a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between the competitiveness of the election and total voter 
turnout.6  To the extent that a higher voter turnout implies that a higher percentage 
of rural electors vote, this supports the proposition that increased electoral 
competition is more likely to prompt African candidates to devote greater resources 
to primary education. 
 
3.  Data on education spending 
  In order to attempt to test the hypotheses laid out above, it would be useful to 
have data on total government spending on education, as well as government 
spending on primary education.  While the coverage is uneven, data on the different 
components of education spending has been compiled by UNESCO for a number of 
African countries.7   These data are also reported in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  Given that there is little if any African education data 
available for the years before 1980, in this study I have concentrated on the period 
1980-98.  I have compiled data on total education spending for 35 countries listed for 
which the average number of annual observations available over the period is 10.8  
Likewise, data on primary education expenditures is available for 33 countries with 
an average of 6 annual observations over the period.9   
Figures 1 and 2 present African averages for overall public spending on 
education as a share of GDP, in addition to public spending on primary education as 
a share of GDP.  As can be seen, after a decline during the 1980s, in the early 1990s 
African governments increased their outlays for education and for primary 
education in particular.   While Figures 1 and 2 are useful for presenting cross-
                                                 
6 They justify this proxy by suggesting that uncompetitive elections are more likely to generate a 
lopsided result with one candidate receiving a large majority of the votes.  The result does not depend 
on this particular measure, however. 
7 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. 
8 8 or more annual observations are available for 27 of these countries.  The remaining countries are 
Angola (4), Benin (1), Chad (2), Equatorial Guinea (2), Guinea-Bissau (1), and Mauritania (5).   
9 5 or more annual observations are available for 25 of the 33 countries.  The remaining 8 are Angola 
(2), Benin (1), Central African Republic (4), Chad (2), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1), 
Mozambique (2), Nigeria (1), Sudan (3).    9
country trends, they mask the fact that there has also been considerable variation in 
patterns of education spending across countries.  Table 1 presents summary statistics 
for four variables: (1) total public spending on education in %GDP (2) public 
spending on primary education in %GDP, (3) public spending on education as a 
share of total spending, and (4) public spending on primary education as a share of 
total spending.  For each of these three variables, between-country variation is quite 
significant.  
Cross-country data on education statistics may be subject to a number of 
potential biases and collection errors.  Behrman and Rosenszweig (1994) have 
argued this for enrollment data collected by UNESCO.  In order to consider this 
possibility, I compared the UNESCO data for overall public spending on education 
with that reported by the IMF in its Government Finance Statistics publication, as well 
as with data collected by Mingat and Suchaut (2000) for African countries.  The 
UNESCO data are in fact very highly correlated with data from both of these other 
sources, and there are almost all no cases of large discrepancies.10  While the IMF 
and Mingat and Suchaut (2000) do not report statistics for primary education 
spending, given that primary education spending (in %GDP) is very highly 
correlated with overall public spending on education, this result should also increase 
confidence in the UNESCO primary education data. 
One final data issue concerns donor financing.  The UNESCO data on 
education spending is based on a questionnaire distributed to governments on an 
annual basis.  Until very recently the questionnaire has not asked governments to 
distinguish between education spending which is financed by revenues and 
education spending financed by donors.  For the majority of African countries in the 
sample this may not pose an issue, as a recent World Bank report (2001) has 
suggested that "official development assistance represents only 3-4 percent of total 
expenditure on education in Africa".  For some countries, however, and notably 
post-conflict states, donor-financed education expenditures may represent up to half 
of all public expenditures on education.  If in filling out their UNESCO  10 
questionnaires governments such as these did not include donor-financed education 
spending in their calculations, it would introduce a degree of measurement error.  
 
 
4.  Measuring electoral competition 
  Researchers in recent years have compiled a number of different cross-
country indices of democracy, political rights, and political competition.  It has 
become increasingly frequent for economists and political scientists to include these 
political variables in cross-country regressions on subjects such as the determinants 
of economic growth.  Two of the most frequently used indices of this sort are the 
Gastil indices of political and civil liberties.  However, as emphasized by Bates 
(1995), the Gastil index remains a very uncertain tool for quantitative research, 
because the methodology used to compile it is not made public.  As a result, while 
the index is scaled from 1 to 7, one has no way of knowing what exact political 
context a value of ￿2￿ or ￿4￿ on the index corresponds to.  Another problem is that 
the Gastil indices and other indices, such as the Polity III measure of democracy, 
appear to measure very broad features of a country￿s political system (democracy vs. 
authoritarianism).  As a result, they can be crude tools if one intends to test a more 
specific hypothesis about the effects of particular political institutions 
  Fortunately for the purposes of this study, a Harvard-based group of 
researchers has compiled specific data on the openness of recruitment of chief 
executives and legislators in African countries over time.11  For executive 
recruitment they asked five questions relevant to the degree of competitiveness: 
1.  Is there a chief executive? 
2.  Was the executive elected? 
3.  Was the executive the only candidate in the election? 
4.  Were multiple political parties allowed to contest the election? 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 The simple correlation coefficient between the UNESCO data and the Mingat and Suchaut data was 
0.92, while the correlation coefficient with the IMF data was 0.82.    
11 See Bates (1995), Ferree and Singh (1999).  11 
5.  Did candidates from more than one party contest the election?  
 
The Harvard team of researchers has arranged the responses to these 
questions to fit a Guttman scale, that is a scale where a positive response on one level 
of the scale implies a positive response to allow lowers levels (Guttman, 1950).  In 
practice, in the 35 country sample used in this study there are three groups of 
countries in terms of levels of electoral competition.  In roughly 28% of country-
years there is no electoral competition, meaning that the country had an executive 
but the executive was not elected.  In a further 37% of country-years there was an 
executive who was elected, but only a single candidate contested the election, or in a 
handful of cases multiple candidates from the same political party contested the 
election.  Finally, in a further 35% of country-years the executive was elected and 
candidates from multiple political parties stood in the election.  Given this 
distribution, I have created three dummy variables to indicate the level of electoral 
competition: ￿no electoral competition￿, ￿single-party competition￿, and 
￿multiparty competition￿.  It is important for purposes of interpretation to note that 
these variables are coded so that a country where the executive is elected in a 
multiparty contest is given a value of 1 for the variable "multiparty competition" but 
a value of 0 for the variable "single-party competition".  This ensures that the two 
variables are uncorrelated when entered into the regression.  As can be seen in 
Figure 3, the percentage of African countries with multiparty competition increased 
very significantly during the 1990s.     
 
 
5.  Panel estimates of the determinants of education spending 
  In order to explore the relationship between electoral competition and 
education spending, I estimated a series of cross-section time-series regressions for 
the African countries for which relevant data is available for the period 1980-1998.  
These involved data concerning both public spending on education in general and 
public spending on primary education in particular.  The regressions in Tables 2 and 
4 use spending in percent of GDP as a dependent variable.  This would seem to be  12 
an appropriate indicator of the resources devoted by government to a particular 
activity.  However, there may be several problems with this method of 
measurement.  First, it ignores the fact that for exogenous reasons, some 
governments may have access to lower levels of revenue than others.  Under these 
circumstances, spending 5% of GDP in education in a country where revenues 
amount to 15% of GDP may represent greater prioritization of education than 
spending 5% of GDP on education when a government collects revenues equivalent 
to 25% of GDP.  Second, when spending variables are expressed relative GDP, then 
changes in relative prices in the economy (between the non-tradeables and 
tradeables sectors) may lead to apparent changes in spending without a government 
actually altering its budgetary priorities.  Given that there were significant shifts in 
relative prices in a number of African economies during the sample period), this 
may be a real concern.  To take account of both of these possibilities the regressions 
in Table 3 and Table 5 consider determinants of spending when education spending 
is expressed as a share of total government spending.               
  As a first step in the inquiry, Figure 3 reports average levels of education 
spending across different types of political regimes, distinguishing between those 
without electoral competition, those with one-party competition, and those with 
multiparty competition.  The differences are quite striking as higher levels of 
electoral competition are associated with high levels of government spending on 
education, and higher levels of spending on primary schools.  Figure 4 shows that 
this correlation between spending and electoral competition also appears to hold for 
changes in regime, as those countries which shifted to multiparty competition in the 
1990s on average saw an increase in overall education spending and in spending on 
primary education.  
  While the results in Figure 3 and 4 may be visually striking, it remains to be 
demonstrated that the apparent relationship between electoral competition and 
education spending is robust to controls for other determinants.  In the regressions 
in Tables 2-5, each of the spending variables is estimated as a function of several 
independent variables, including indicator variables for ￿single-party￿ political 
competition, ￿multiparty￿ political competition, and dummy variables for elections  13 
in the previous, current, and following year.  Since the base group here is countries 
without electoral competition, the ￿single-party￿ and ￿multiparty￿ variables then 
capture estimated differences relative to this group.  The inclusion of the electoral 
dummies is intended to test the common argument that during electoral ‘periods 
governments will face increased pressures to spend.  While the number of obvious 
control variables to use in these regressions is limited, I also included the log of per 
capita GDP as an independent variable, based on the conjecture that governments in 
richer countries may tend to spend a greater share of their national income on 
education, while governments in richer countries are also likely to devote a smaller 
share of their total education spending to primary schools.   
I also include total overseas aid as a control, based on the fact that when 
negotiating structural adjustment packages, donors in recent years have frequently 
suggested that governments should privilege expenditures on key services like 
education, and in particular primary education.  Rather than arguing that aid is 
directly allocated to education expenditures, given the earlier observation that direct 
donor financing of public education in Africa remains limited in most countries, the 
argument here is that an increased reliance on donor financing should prompt a 
government to pursue expenditure objectives advocated by donors.  The variable 
￿overseas aid￿ represents total overseas development assistance in % GDP.  
  Table 2 estimates total government spending on education in %GDP using 
three different methods.  Regression (1) is a pooled OLS regression which shows that 
both single-party and multiparty political competition are positively and 
significantly correlated with total government spending on education.  The 
coefficient on ￿multiparty competition￿ is larger than that for single-party political 
competition, however, as a move to multiparty competition is estimated to result in 
an increase of total education spending by 1.4% of GDP.  Spending on education 
does not seem to be significantly different during electoral periods according to 
these estimates, however.  A set of dummy variables for unobserved year effects was 
not jointly significant in this specification, and so it was excluded.12 
                                                 
12 The same was true for all other regressions in the study.  14 
  Regression (2) is a fixed effects model which controls for unobserved 
country-specific effects.  The coefficients on both electoral competition variables 
remain highly significant, although the coefficient on ￿multiparty competition￿ is 
now small smaller in magnitude than in the OLS regressions.  The coefficient on 
￿single-party￿ competition is now actually larger than in the OLS estimates. The 
election variables remain insignificant and the coefficient on overseas aid is actually 
negative and highly significant.   
According to regression 2, somewhat surprisingly, countries where executives 
are elected in multiparty competition are not actually estimated to have higher levels 
of education spending than are countries where executives are elected in single-
candidate competitions.  Further observation suggests that there is a clear reason for 
the difference between the OLS and fixed effects estimates in regression 2; the 
country mean values for education spending which are subtracted out in the fixed 
effects model are positively and significantly correlated with the "multiparty 
competition" variable 0.37 p<0.01, and negatively correlated with the "single-party 
competition" variable -0.33 p<0.01.  The same is true for all other fixed effects 
regressions in this paper.  Given that the OLS results strongly suggest that 
"multiparty competition" has a larger effect on spending than does a move to "single-
party competition", however, this fixed effects result should not be taken as 
demonstrating that the effects of the two types of competition are equivalent.13  The 
results should be read instead as suggesting that the data allow us to reject the 
hypothesis that the observed distinction between countries with elected executives 
and countries with unelected executives is attributable to unobserved country 
effects, but that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the observed difference in the 
coefficients for "multiparty competition" and "single-party" competition in the OLS 
regressions is attributable to unobserved country effects.  This is attributable in part 
to the fact that four countries in the sample have had multi-party competition 
throughout the period considered (Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, and Zimbabwe).  If 
                                                 
13 Random effects estimates also led to a similar conclusion, though they were rejected based on the 
results of a Hausman test for correlation between the random error component and the explanatory 
variables.   15 
one excludes these four countries, then the correlation between the country means 
from the fixed effects regression and the variable "multiparty competition" drops to 
0.13.  The coefficient on "multiparty competition" in the OLS estimates remains 
positive and highly significant after excluding these four countries, though it is 
somewhat smaller in magnitude (0.70).  The same holds true for the regressions in 
Tables 3-5.        
One potential concern with regressions (1) and (2) is that foreign aid in 
particular might not be pre-determined.  Foreign aid might be endogenous to 
education spending to the extent that countries which spend more on education 
might subsequently have less need for foreign aid if they enjoy high rates of growth.  
Likewise, foreign aid might be endogenous if donors give higher levels of assistance 
to governments that have a track record of prioritizing education.  To deal with this 
issue I also estimated a fixed-effects model where I instrumented for overseas aid 
using lagged differences of the aid variable.  By instrumenting for aid with lagged 
differences I am ensuring that my instruments are not themselves correlated with 
country fixed effects.14  Regression (3) shows that the result with regard to political 
competition remains essentially unchanged.  In addition, the coefficient on foreign 
aid remains statistically significant and it is actually more negative than in the fixed 
effects model without instruments.  
Table 3 estimates government spending on education in percent of total 
government spending using OLS, fixed effects, and fixed effects with instrumental 
variables.  The results are quite similar to the Table 2 estimates.  Both ￿single-party￿ 
political competition and ￿multiparty￿ political competition are positively correlated 
with education spending, though in the fixed effects estimates the coefficient on 
￿multiparty￿ competition is somewhat smaller than in the OLS regression, while the 
                                                 
14 I also considered using a GMM estimator of the type proposed for panel data by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), but given that this estimator relies upon a first-difference transformation to deal with 
unobserved country effects, it was less appropriate for the data in this study which exhibit a high 
degree of persistence over time.  A system GMM estimator which uses information from both a levels 
equation with lagged differences as instruments and a first-differences equation with lagged levels as 
instruments would not have been likely to produce significantly more efficient estimates either.  This 
is because in practice lagged levels of education spending in the sample are poor predictors of future 
changes in education spending.    16 
coefficient on ￿single-party￿ competition is somewhat larger.  The coefficient on 
overseas aid is negative and significant at at least the 10% level in all three 
regressions here.   
Table 4 uses the same specifications as in Tables 2 and 4 but to investigate the 
determinants of spending on primary education (in %GDP).  The coefficient on both 
electoral competition variables are again positive and statistically significant in the 
OLS estimates.  Based on this regression, establishing multiparty competition would 
be associated with an increase in primary education spending by 0.8% GDP.  In the 
fixed effects regressions the coefficients for both ￿single-party￿ and ￿multiparty￿ 
competition are smaller in magnitude than in regression 1.  Finally, the coefficient on 
overseas aid is again negative and highly significant in all three regressions.  
Table 5 reports estimates of the determinants of primary education spending, 
when outlays are measured as a percentage of total government spending.  The 
results here are again quite similar to those reported in Table 4.  Both ￿single-party￿ 
and ￿multiparty￿ political competition are associated with higher expenditures on 
primary education. 
 
6.  Alternative specifications and robustness 
  There are a number of issues concerning measurement of my different 
variables as well as potentially omitted variables, and this section considers each in 
turn.  One possible oversight may involve the effect of national wage decisions.  
Wages for teachers are the largest single spending item for education ministries in 
Africa and in particular for primary schools.  Given that decisions regarding civil 
service wages in African countries are typically made in a centralized manner, it may 
be the case that education expenditures depend more on the overall remuneration 
policy of a government than on the priority it gives to education.  To consider this 
possibility I re-estimated the regressions while including an additional variable that 
represents the average civil servant wage as a multiple of per capita GDP.  Data were 
only available for the period after 1986 (from Leinert and Modi, 1997), resulting in 
the loss of a number of observations in the sample.  The coefficients on the electoral  17 
competition variables remained significant in the OLS regressions and the fixed 
effects regressions, though they did not remain significant in the fixed effects 
regressions after including the wage variable.  It should be noted, however, that this 
loss of significance is most likely due to the fact that the sample was reduced to half 
its original size in these re-estimated regressions.   
A second potential specification issue concerns my foreign aid variable.  
Different donors may attach different priorities to education expenditures, yet the 
variable used in Tables 2-5 aggregates aid from all different donors.  As a result, it 
may cloud the effects which individual donors have on education policies.  To 
consider this possibility I re-estimated the regressions while substituting net aid 
flows from the World Bank for the overall aid variable.  This is based on the fact that 
the World Bank has been particularly active in attempting to push governments 
towards prioritizing education expenditures.  Interestingly, the coefficient on the 
World Bank aid variable was always negative and significant in the OLS regressions 
and negative and generally significant in the fixed effects regressions.  This suggests 
that the results with regard to aid and education spending cannot be attributed to 
the fact that I have aggregated aid from different sources.   
I also investigated the possibility that the results presented above were 
influenced by outliers.  To do this I re-estimated each regression and computed the 
dfbeta statistic for the two electoral competition variables and for the aid variable.  
The dfbeta statistic captures the influence which each individual point has on the 
estimation of the regression coefficient in question.  Following common practice, I 
repeated each of these regressions while excluding observations for which the 
abs(dfbeta)>2/sqrt(N) where N is the number of observations.  In the OLS estimates 
the only significant change involved the coefficient on the "single-party" political 
competition variable which in regression 1 from Table 2 and 1 from Table 3 became 
smaller in magnitude and less significant.  The coefficients on the "multiparty" 
political competition variable were significant and unchanged in magnitude in all 
cases.  The coefficients on the aid variable were also largely unchanged.  The results 
of the fixed effects estimates also remained largely unchanged with the following 
exceptions.  In regression 2 from Table 3 the coefficient on the "multiparty" political  18 
competition variable became less significant (p=0.24).  In regression 2 from Table 5 
neither of the competition variables nor the aid variable remained significant.  On 
the whole, then, this exercise suggests that neither my general result that political 
competition is associated with higher public education spending and higher 
spending on primary education in particular, nor my results with regard to aid flows 
and education spending can be attributed to outliers.        
As a final robustness issue, I considered whether the results reported in 
Tables 2-5 are affected by serial correlation of the error terms.  This seems a plausible 
concern given that education spending is likely to change relatively gradually from 
year to year within a country, and my estimates do not include a lagged dependent 
variable.  However, testing for serial correlation of the error terms in my regressions 
is complicated by the highly unbalanced panels that I used for the estimates.  When I 
re-estimated the OLS regressions from Tables 2-5, including an AR1 term, the results 
with regard to the coefficients on ￿multiparty￿ political competition and overseas 
aid were largely unchanged.  The coefficient on ￿single-party￿ political competition 
was generally less significant.  When I re-estimated the fixed effects models while 
also including an AR1 term the results were essentially unchanged.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics on education spending 
 







Government spending on 
education %GDP 
324 4.12  0.86  1.91  0.37  10.3 
Government spending on 
primary education % GDP 
188 1.93  0.35  1.04  0.34  5.17 
Govt spending on education as 
% of total spending 
324 16.3  5.1  3.5  2.6 29.2 
Govt spending on primary 
education as % of total 
spending 
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Figure 2: Trends in the openness of political competition 
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no competition single party
competition
multiparty competition
Figure 3: Electoral competition and education spending
total education budget primary education budget
 

















No increase in competition Increased electoral competition
Figure 4: Changes in electoral competition and 
changes in  education spending: 1985-1991 vs. 1992-1998
Change in total education budget Change in primary education budget
 
Notes: median values.   There were 9 countries within the sample for which electoral 
competition remained unchanged, 2 for which it declined, and 15 for which it increased. 
 









Table 2: Electoral competition and the education budget I 
(Dependent variable: govt spending on education, % GDP) 
 





























































N=  324 324  324 
R2  0.31 0.13  0.13 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p<0.01 p=0.46  p=0.61 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.38 
Standard errors in parentheses. Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged differences. 








Table 3: Electoral competition and the education budget II 
(Dependent variable: % of total govt spending to education) 
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(.088) 






N=  324 324  324 
R2  0.23 0.18  0.19 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p<0.01 p=0.59  p=0.54 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.89 








Table 4: Electoral competition and primary education I 
(Dependent variable: govt spending on primary education %GDP) 
 





























































N=  188 188  188 
R2  0.39 0.09  0.17 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p=0.01 p=0.74  p=0.81 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.09 
Standard errors in parentheses. Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged differences. 
 








Table 5: Electoral competition and primary education II 
(Dependent variable: % of total govt spending to primary schools) 
 





























































N=  188 188  188 
R2  0.38 0.02  0.13 
H0:single-
party=multiparty 
p=0.07 p=0.72  p=0.92 
Overidentifying 
restrictions 
  p=0.44 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Regression (3) instruments for Aid using first four lagged 
differences.  
  
 